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All issues Volume 27 (2021) Supplement ESAIM: COCV, 27 (2021) S12 References
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Issue
ESAIM: COCV
Volume 27, 2021
Regular articles published in advance of the transition of the journal to Subscribe to Open (S2O). Free supplement sponsored by the Fonds National pour la Science Ouverte
Article Number S12
Number of page(s) 31
DOI https://doi.org/10.1051/cocv/2020056
Published online 01 March 2021
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